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Abstract
Roman legal sources concerning usucapion in place of an heir (usucapio pro herede) are not numerous. 
We will only fi nd a relevant fragment in the second commentary of Gaius’ Institutiones and a short text 
Pro herede vel pro possessore in the 41st book of Justinian’s Digesta. The paper focuses on the exegesis 
of the fi rst of the sources. According to the institution of usucapion in place of an heir, anybody who 
possessed any goods belonging to an inheritance could acquire the inheritance within a year. Therefore, 
the main purpose of the institution seemed to be determining who was going to be responsible for 
continuing the domestic worship (sacra familiaria). When the sacra had lost their social signifi cance, 
usucapio pro herede changed its subject to the goods that belonged to an inheritance, not the inherit-
ance as such. In classical Roman law, usucapion in place of an heir started to be considered a dishon-
ourable legal institution. Emperor Hadrian marginalised usucapio pro herede through a decree of the 
senate sponsored by him. The senatus consultum made usucapion possible to reverse by the actual heir. 
Emperor Marcus Aurelius introduced a new crime, the crimen expilatae hereditatis, which consisted 
in taking over goods that belonged to someone else’s inheritance. However, usucapio pro herede was 
never abolished in a legal act.
Keywords: usucapion, usucapio, heir, inheritance, goods belonging to an inheritance, acquisition, 
Roman legal sources, Gaius
Introduction
Usucapion is a specifi cally Roman institution. This is particularly clear when we com-
pare Roman law with Germanic laws, which did not recognise usucapion. The sources 
contain two quite late classical defi nitions of usucapion. The fi rst, from the Tituli ex 




corpore Ulpiani, post-classical extracts of Ulpian’s writings by an anonymous compiler, 
reads: Usucapio est autem dominii adeptio per continuationem possessionis anni vel bi-
ennii: rerum mobilium anni, immobilium biennii (“Usucapion is the acquisition of own-
ership through continuous possession for one or two years: one year for chattels and two 
years for immovables”1). The second defi nition can be found in Justinian’s Digest, in 
one of the introductory sentences of the title on usucapion and ways of interrupting usu-
capion.2 The author of the second defi nition was Modestinus, a student of Ulpian, who 
was regarded as the last great Roman jurist. This defi nition is almost exactly the same as 
the fi rst one, with the exception that the period of usucapion is not specifi ed3: Usucapio 
est adiectio dominii per continuationem possessionis temporis lege defi niti (Modestinus, 
book 5 of Pandects, “Usucapion is the addition of ownership by means of continuous 
possession for a time prescribed by law”4). There is agreement as to the general purposes 
of usucapion, which basically consisted in changing the legal status of an estate to match 
the actual state of its long-term, peaceful possession. As a result, endless ownership dis-
putes were avoided,5 and ownership was easy to prove if there was a trial.6 The eviden-
tiary function was, incidentally, probably the original purpose of usucapion.7 Usucapio 
pro herede, usucapion in place of an heir, was a particular type of usucapion.8 One of the 
two main sources of our knowledge about this institution is The Institutes of Gaius. The 
other is the fi fth title of the 41st book of Justinian’s Digest, <Usucapio> pro herede vel 
pro possessore. The fragment of The Institutes in question is contained in book 2 of the 
famous textbook, in the part on acquiring and disposing of things, in the longer descrip-
tion of the institution of usucapion as such. The description of the institution of usuca-
pion is included in fragments from G. 2.41 to G. 2.51 and from G. 2.59 to G. 2.61, and 
the description of usucapion in place of an heir is in fragments from G. 2.52 to G. 2.58. 
Even a comparison of just the length of the texts draws attention to the specifi c nature 
of the institution in question, especially since Gaius does not distinguish other titles of 
1  UE 19.8, in fi ne.
2  D. 41.3. De usurpationibus et usucapionibus. Justinian’s compilation in the entire text quoted from: 
Corpus iuris civilis. Institutiones et Digesta, eds. Th. Mommsen, P. Krueger, Berolini 1928; Corpus iuris 
civilis. Codex Iustinianus, ed. P. Krueger, Berolini 1906.
3  Pasquale Voci holds that Modestinus’ defi nition is a direct repetition of Ulpian’s one, with the omission 
of the specifi c period of usucapion, and that the words temporis lege defi niti were added by the compilers. Cf. 
P. Voci, Modi di acquisto della proprietà. Corso di diritto romano, Milano 1952, p. 159.
4  D. 41.3.3. (English translations of all fragments from The Digest of Justinian, vol. 1–4, ed. A. Watson, 
Philadelphia 1998).
5  Cic. Caecin. 26.74; D. 41.10.5 pr. Neratius, book 5 of Parchments.
6  G. 2.44; D. 41.3.1. Gaius, book 21, On the Provincial Edict.
7  W. Litewski, Rzymskie prawo prywatne, Warszawa 2003, p. 339.
8  As Constantin St. Tomulescu notes, pro herede can be translated as “in place of an heir” (“instead of an 
heir”), “on the basis of the title of heir” or “as heir”. The author convincingly shows the nonsensicality of the 
second and the imprecision of the third translation, while he favours the fi rst one in the context of usucapio 
pro herede. In this analysis, following in the footsteps of the Romanian scholar, I will be using the translation 
“in place of an heir” and analogous ones in the case of the other types of usucapion with the preposition pro. 
Cf. C.St. Tomulescu, Gaius 2,55 e l’«usucapio pro herede» [in:] Studi in onore di Giuseppe Grosso, vol. 4, 
Torino 1971, pp. 442–444.
KS 2 lam anglojęzyczny.indd   2 2019-02-07   09:35:23
3
Artykuły – Articles
Usucapio pro herede in The Institutes of Gaius
usucapion in his work, such as pro emptore or pro donato, which are scrupulously listed 
by Justinian’s compilers in the successive titles of the 41st book of the Digest.9
The specificity of usucapio pro herede
Thanks to Gaius’ fondness for historical digressions,10 the text contains not only a de-
scription of the construction of usucapion in place of an heir from the 2nd century AD, but 
also some valuable information on the archaic form, which had been abandoned before 
the jurist’s activity.11 Therefore, the jurist’s text can be used to compare the two forms 
and ask about their mutual relation, as well as the values behind each of them. Let us cite 
Gaius himself:
G. 2.52: Rursus ex contrario accidit, ut qui sciat alienam rem se possidere, usucapiat, velut si rem 
hereditariam, cuius possessionem heres nondum nactus est, aliquis possederit; nam ei concessum 
est usucapere, si modo ea res est, quae recipit usucapionem: quae species possessionis et usucapi-
onis pro herede vocatur.12
G. 2.52: On the other hand, there are cases where one who knows that he is in the possession of 
another’s property will acquire it by usucapio. Thus, where a man takes possession of a thing which 
belongs to an inheritance, but of which the heir has not yet obtained possession, he is allowed to 
acquire it by usucapio, provided that it is a thing that is susceptible of usucapio. This kind of pos-
session and usucapio is termed pro herede (as heir).
In the fragment preceding this sentence Gaius, discussing usucapion, presents two 
necessary conditions: the possessor was in good faith and the property had not been 
stolen.13 To illustrate his lecture, he quotes a case in which someone obtained the pos-
9  The headings of the successive titles of the book in question are: D. 41.4. Pro emptore; D. 41.5. Pro 
herede vel possessore; D. 41.6. Pro donato; D. 41.7. Pro derelicto; D. 41.8. Pro legato; D. 41.9. Pro dote; 
D. 41.10. Pro suo.
10  W. Litewski, Jurysprudencja rzymska, Kraków 2000, pp. 101, 142. A well-known Polish Romanist, 
Stanisław Wróblewski, cautions against overestimating Gaius as a historian of law, but he considers Gaius’ 
historical remarks on usucapio pro herede to be unquestionable. Cf. S. Wróblewski, Usucapio pro herede, 
“Czasopismo Prawnicze i Ekonomiczne” 1923, vol. XXI, no. 1–6, p. 221.
11  In the rest of the text, I will be referring to usucapion in place of an heir in the form described by Gaius 
as “classical” and in the form which had earlier been abandoned as “archaic”. These terms are purely descrip-
tive and mean that the former functioned in the classical period of Roman jurisprudence, while the latter did 
not any more. Giovanna Coppola Bisazza sees it fi t to refer to the earlier form as usucapio hereditatis, and to 
the later one as usucapio pro herede. Cf. G. Coppola Bisazza, «Usucapio pro herede» – «aditio hereditatis». 
Un rapporto da chiarire, RDR 2011, vol. 11, p. 1.
12  In the entire analysis the Latin text of The Institutes of Gaius and other pre-Justinian sources is quoted 
from: Fontes iuris romani antejustiniani. Pars altera. Auctores, ed. J. Baviera, Florentiae 1968, pp. 9–192. 
All English translations of Institutiones: F. De Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius. Part I: Text with critical notes 
and translation, Oxford 1946.
13  G. 2.51: Fundi quoque alieni potest aliquis sine vi possessionem nancisci, quae vel ex neglegentia do-
mini vacet, vel quia dominus sine successore decesserit vel longo tempore afuerit; quam si ad alium bona fi de 
accipientem transtulerit, poterit usucapere possessor: et quamvis ipse, qui vacantem possessionem nanctus 
est, intellegat alienum esse fundum, tamen nihil hoc bonae fi dei possessori ad usucapionem nocet, <cum> 
improbata sit eorum sententia, qui putaverint furtivum fundum fi eri posse. “It may happen also that a man 
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session of an estate without using force against its owner.14 Therefore, the situation is 
not subject to the lex Iulia et Plautia,15 according to which a thing cannot be usucapted 
even by a possessor in good faith if it had been taken away from the owner using force. 
At the same time, this is not a case of theft because – in accordance with the victorious 
opinion of the jurisprudence – an estate cannot be the subject of theft. This is an impor-
tant circumstance because according to the Law of Twelve Tables (T. 1.22)16 and the lex 
Atinia,17 a stolen thing cannot be usucapted.18 The possessor is in bad faith, as he is fully 
aware that he is not the owner. However, if he gives the estate to a third person, this per-
son will possess it in good faith, thus meeting the basic requirement of usucapion. In this 
way, Gaius illustrates two requirements of usucapion: the usucapted thing had not been 
stolen and the possessor took possession of the thing in good faith. It is worth noting that 
to Gaius the fi rst and fundamental factor is the possessor’s good faith. The jurist presents 
in G. 2.49 a case of a stolen thing: this thing cannot be usucapted either by the thief or by 
a third person who is in good faith. What is remarkable, however, is the justifi cation of 
why such a thing cannot be usucapted by the thief: after all, he can be accused not only 
of bad faith but also, obviously, the possession of the stolen thing. The author clearly 
notes, however:
may without violance take possession of another’s land, which is lying vacant, either through the owner’s 
neglect, or because the owner has died without a successor or has been absent for a considerable time; if 
the taker transfers this possession to one who receives it in good faith, the transferee will be able to acquire the 
land by usucapio; and even though he who took the vacant possession knows that the land is another’s, this is 
no obstacle to usucapio by the bona fi de possessor, since the opinion once held that land can be stolen has 
been exploded”.
14  G. 2.45: Sed aliquando etiamsi maxime quis bona fi de alienam rem possideat, non tamen illi usucapio 
procedit, veluti si quis rem furtivam aut vi possessam possideat; nam furtivam lex XII tabularum usucapi pro-
hibet, vi possessam lex Iulia et Plautia. “Sometimes, however, a party who possesses property in the utmost 
good faith still cannot acquire the same by usucaption; for instance, where he has possession of an article 
which has been stolen or obtained by violence, for the Law of the Twelve Tables forbids stolen property to 
be acquired by usucaption, and the Lex Julia et Plautia makes the same provision with reference to property 
obtained by force”.
15  Gaius mentions one lex, although his statement in fact probably refers to the leges Iuliae de vi publica 
et privata and the lex Plautia de vi. Cf. G. Longo, s.v. Lex Julia de vi publica e Lex Julia de vi privata (Leges 
Juliae de vi publica et privata) and Lex Plautia de vi [in:] Novissimo Digesto Italiano, vol. 9, eds. A. Azara, 
E. Eula, Torino 1963, pp. 812, 815–816 and bibliography.
16  Ibidem, […] nam furtivam lex XII tabularum usucapi prohibet […].
17  D. 41.3.33 pr. Julianus, book 44 of the Digest; D. 41. 3.4.6. Paulus, book 54 On the Edict.
18  The text of the lex Atinia was recorded by Aulus Gellius in the Noctes Atticae 17.7.1: Legis veteris 
Atiniae verba sunt: quod subruptum erit, eius rei aeterna auctoritas esto. “Whatever shall have been stolen, 
let the right to claim the thing be everlasting”. (English translation quoted from Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, 
ed. John C. Rolfe, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Gel.+17.7&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%
3A2007.01.0072, access: 24 August 2018). His account, as incomplete, is supplemented with Paulus’ opinion 
in D. 41.3.4.6. Paulus book 54 On the edict: Quod autem dicit lex Atinia, ut res furtiva non usucapiatur, nisi 
in potestatem eius, cui subrepta est, revertatur, sic acceptum est, ut in domini potestatem debeat reverti, non 
in eius utique, cui subreptum est. “Now, when the lex Atinia says that a stolen thing can be usucapted only 
if it has fi rst returned into the power of the person from whom it was appropriated, this is to be interpreted as 
meaning that it must return into the power of its actual owner, not into that of the person from whom it was 
in fact taken”. It is commonly accepted that the Law of the Twelve Tables introduced a ban on usucapion of 
a stolen thing, while the later lex Atinia upheld it, at the same time allowing the usucapion of a stolen thing if 
it had been returned to its owner. For the requirement of no theft and controversies as to the dating and scope 
of the lex Atinia see P. Voci, Modi di acquisto…, p. 161 ff.
Kamil Sorka
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G. 2.49: Quod vulgo dicitur furtivarum rerum […] usucapionem […] prohibitam esse, non eo 
pertinet, ut ne ipse fur […] usucapere possit (nam huic alia ratione usucapio non competit, quia 
scilicet mala fi de possidet). 
The saying that the usucapio of things stolen [...] is forbidden by the law of the Twelve Tables does 
not mean that the actual thief [...] is unable so to acquire (for to him usucapio is closed for another 
reason, namely that he possesses in bad faith).
Gaius believes that the test of good faith is logically more primary, followed later by 
the requirement of the thing not being faulty, i.e. stolen. This is diff erent in the famous 
medieval hexametre, which in the fi rst place emphasised the characteristics of the thing 
which was to be usucapted.19 It is true that in the poetic metre res habilis, titulus, fi des, 
possession and tempus presented the commonly accepted conditions of usucapion in the 
law of Justinian’s times.
In the above quotation from The Institutes, the jurist gives another example using 
contrast (rursus) with the requirement of good faith; this time, he illustrates usucapion in 
bad faith. Usucapio pro herede in the form contemporary to Gaius, i.e. in the second half 
of the 2nd century AD, is an exception to the requirement of good faith in cases of usuca-
pion.20 The confi guration of this usucapio is as follows: a third person (aliquis) usucapts 
a thing which belongs to the inheritance (rem hereditariam), unless the heir (heres) ob-
tained possession of it. The usucaptor knows, of course, that the thing does not belong to 
him and that he has no basis to think otherwise; therefore, he is a possessor in bad faith. 
This eliminates the primary requirement of usucapion according to Gaius; which leaves 
secondary ones, i.e. fi rst of all the requirement of a lack of theft. Let us recall, however, 
that an estate – the most valuable part of an inheritance – could not be the subject of 
theft. Therefore, it was not protected against theft. Moreover, although the jurisprudence 
did not have a unanimous opinion on the nature of an inheritance which had not been 
accepted, a so-called vacant inheritance (hereditas iacens),21 until the early 3rd century 
AD it was commonly thought that all property which belonged to a vacant inheritance 
belonged to nobody, and therefore could not be stolen by means of appropriation.22 It 
is accepted that heredes sui gained possession of the deceased’s things at the time of 
19  For the history of the development of mnemonic formulae concerning the requirements of usucapion 
in Roman and canon law see E.J.H. Schrage, Res habilis, titulus, fi des, possessio, tempus: A medieval mne-
monic hexameter? [in:] Liber amicorum Guido Tsuno, ed. F. Sturm, Frankfurt am Main 2013, pp. 325–339. 
Cf. W. Dajczak, T. Giaro, F. Longchamps de Bérier, Prawo rzymskie. U podstaw prawa prywatnego, War-
szawa 2009, p. 385.
20  W. Litewski, Jurysprudencja…, p. 65.
21  Cf. for instance the diff erent opinion of Neratius, quoted by Paulus in D. 47.19.6 (Paulus, book 1, On 
Neratius), in which he regarded the taking of an inherited thing as theft unless the person taking it did not 
know that the thing was part of an inheritance and did not belong to a living person. The British scholar Geof-
frey Mac Cormack believes that until Neratius’ times the conclusion of any type of usucapio pro herede was 
probably aditio, not the heir taking possession of the things belonging to the inheritance. G. Mac Cormack, 
Usucapio pro herede, res hereditariae and furtum, RIDA 1978, vol. 25, p. 300.
22  W. Osuchowski, Hereditas iacens. Poglądy jurydyczne na istotę spadku leżącego w rzymskim prawie 
klasycznym i justyniańskim [in:] Rozprawy prawnicze. Księga pamiątkowa dla uczczenia pracy naukowej 
Kazimierza Przybyłowskiego, Warszawa–Kraków 1964, p. 213. Regardless of the issue of the delict of theft, 
Marcus Aurelius introduced the crimen expilatae hereditatis (D. 47.19).
Usucapio pro herede in The Institutes of Gaius
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opening the estate,23 which would protect them against classical usucapio pro herede, in 
contrast to heredes extranei, who were not protected until they gained possession of the 
things belonging to the inheritance. From that moment forward taking res hereditariae 
meant committing theft and running the risk of facing an actio furti.24 It follows from 
the above that in the classical form of usucapio pro herede any heres extraneus, unless 
he showed good refl exes and promptly took possession of the inheritance, could within 
a relatively short period of time lose even all elements of the inheritance, condemning 
himself to an inane nomen heredis (G. 2.224) and possible inheritance debts, similarly 
to the situation of exhausting the entire inheritance by legacies. In such a case, the law 
interfered, more or less successfully, on behalf of the heir. Firstly, we should mention the 
lex Falcidia, a plebiscitum enacted in 40 AD.25 On this basis, legacies basically could 
not exceed three quarters of the inheritance; if they did exceed this limit, the heir was 
entitled to decrease them proportionately. In any case, the heir was left with at least one 
quarter of the inheritance. However, the position of the heir in classical usucapio pro 
herede was completely diff erent, as he was deprived of any means to protect his inter-
ests. It is therefore unsurprising that in the later part of his commentary Gaius judges the 
institution quite harshly, going so far as to call it inproba possessio et usucapio (G. 2.55), 
“thoroughly dishonourable possession and usucaption”.
Further on in his commentary, Gaius provides more details on classical usucapio, 
adding more information about the elements of the construction:
G. 2.53: Et in tantum haec usucapio concessa est, ut et res, quae solo continentur, anno usucapi-
antur. 54 Quare autem hoc casu etiam soli rerum annua constituta sit usucapio, illa ratio est, quod 
olim rerum hereditariarum possessione uelut ipsae hereditates usucapi credebantur, scilicet anno. 
Lex enim XII tabularum soli quidem res biennio usucapi iussit, ceteras uero anno: ergo hereditas 
in ceteris rebus uidebatur esse, quia soli non est, quia neque corporalis est. <Et> quamuis postea 
creditum sit ipsas hereditates usucapi non posse, tamen in omnibus rebus hereditariis, etiam quae 
solo tenentur, annua usucapio remansit.26
So liberally is this kind of usucapion allowed, that even land is thereby acquired in one year. The 
reason why in this case usucapion of land as well as of other things in one year is admitted is that 
in former times through the possession of things comprised in an inheritance the inheritance itself 
was deemed to be acquired by usucapion. and this in one year. For the law of the Twelve Tables 
laid down that lands should be acquired by usucapion in two years and other things in one. Thus 
an inheritance, not being land, indeed non even corporal, was held to be among other things. And 
though later it was held that an inheritance itself could not be acquired by usucapion, yet usucapion 
in one year survived for everything, including land, comprised in an inheritance.
23  F. Longchamps de Bérier, Law of Succession: Roman Legal Framework and Comparative Law Per-
spective, Warszawa 2011, p. 90.
24  G. Mac Cormack, Usucapio…, p. 297. Jerzy Krzynówek emphasises the connection between the 
notion of theft and the existence of usucapio pro herede. Cf. J. Krzynówek, Uwagi do “usucapio lucrativa” 
G.2.52–61, “Studia Iuridica” 2003, vol. XLI, pp. 156–157. Cf. G. 3.201; D. 41.3.29.
25  F. Longchamps de Bérier, Law…, pp. 141–142.
26  Giovanna Coppola Bisazza believes the most probable wording of the text is: […] quod olim rerum 
hereditariarum possessiones ut ipsae hereditates usucapi credebantur […]. Cf. G. Coppola Bisazza, Studi 
sulla pro herede gestio. La struttura originaria del „gerere pro herede”, Milano 1987, pp. 74–75 with bib-
liography. 
Kamil Sorka
KS 2 lam anglojęzyczny.indd   6 2019-02-07   09:35:23
7
Artykuły – Articles
The fragment previously quoted in its entirety presented the lack of the requirement 
of good faith as the fundamental diff erence between usucapio pro herede and the other 
forms of usucapion. The fragment quoted here draws attention to the exceptional, very 
short period of usucapion; a year, also in the case of immovables which were part of the 
inheritance. The question arises: why were immovables not subject to the two-year pe-
riod of usucapion normal in Roman law? Gaius, justifying this unorthodox solution, only 
quotes the example of the Law of the Twelve Tables. He does not off er any commentary, 
or attempt to fi nd the cause and eff ect between the regulation in the Law and the one con-
temporary to him. It seems, however, that the very reference to the Law may, in the given 
context, perform the function of a historical argument, which incidentally was quite rare 
in the discourse of Roman jurists.27 Namely, according to Gaius, the Law of the Twelve 
Tables specifi ed the two-year period only for immovables, that is – a contrario – since 
the inheritance itself (even one comprising an immovable) is not an immovable, it should 
be given a year-long period of usucapion. The author makes some mental shortcuts in 
a very laconic way: he moves from an inherited thing (immovable) to the inheritance, 
which includes this thing. The inheritance is shown as a whole which can be usucapted. 
Presenting his readers with the historical perspective on the discussed institution (olim), 
he describes its older, archaic form. The subject of this older form of usucapio pro herede 
were not, as in Gaius’ times, res hereditariae, but the hereditas itself. This diff erence 
has really far-reaching consequences. As Gennaro Franciosi notes, the term hereditas 
comes from heres, not the other way around.28 What this means is that originally, heredi-
tas might have been simply a term for obtaining the position of an heir. It is commonly 
accepted that archaic usucapio pro herede resulted in obtaining the title of heres, i.e. 
acquiring the hereditas29 with all its consequences, such as inheritance debts and succes-
sion to the family sacra, i.e. the domestic cult. A remnant of this state of things in the 
Classical Period was the requirement that the person usucapting pro herede had a right 
to make a testament, although at that time he no longer acquired the inheritance.30 After 
acquiring the inheritance the heir becomes the owner of all the things belonging to the 
inheritance and no other heir needs to be found; the purpose of succession is achieved, 
therefore it is not possible for another person to acquire the title of heres by means of 
archaic usucapio after the heres accepts the inheritance. This refers mainly to testate 
heirs; the problem of intestate heirs was diff erent. Firstly, we should note that according 
to the Law of the Twelve Tables, the heres suus acquired the inheritance by operation of 
law, without having to take any initiative.31 Therefore, archaic usucapio only put testate 
and intestate heirs extranei in danger of losing the entire inheritance, unless they per-
formed the aditio within a year, which was the period of usucapio pro herede. It seems 
27  T. Giaro, s.v. Gaius [in:] Brill’s New Pauly Encyclopaedia of the Ancient World, vol. 5, eds. H. Cancik, 
H. Schneider, Leiden–Boston 2004, pp. 643–644.
28  G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 52.
29  Ibidem, p. 6 with bibliography; for the polemic with lone voices, see especially E.F. Bruck, Über 
römisches Recht im Rahmen der Kulturgeschichte, Berlin 1954, p. 40; G. Scherillo, Successione ed estizione 
dei rapporti giuridici [in:] Studi in onore di G.M. De Francesco, vol. 2, Milano 1957, p. 612.
30  D. 41.5.4. Paulus, book 5, On the Lex Julia et Papia: Constat eum, qui testamenti factionem habet, 
pro herede usucapere posse. “It is settled that one who has testamenti factio [as heir] can usucapt as heir”.
31  F. Longchamps de Bérier, Law…, p. 93.
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that in this way the heir could secure his interests much easier than by taking separate 
inherited things into his eff ective possession, as was the case in classical usucapio pro 
herede. All these confl icts of interest do not appear at all in the case of the hereditas 
iacens, so the situation seems more appropriate for using the institution in question.
The understanding of the term hereditas
At this point it is worth remarking on the subject of archaic usucapio pro herede. Gaius 
puts the hereditas in the category of res incorporales.32 However, a similar opinion cer-
tainly cannot be ascribed to representatives of the pontifi cal jurisprudence,33 because the 
term res incorporalis was probably fi rst introduced into the legal terminology by Gaius 
in his textbook; in any case, the term did not catch on in the analyses of jurists of the 
Classical Period.34 Originally, it emerged in the sphere of philosophy, from which it did 
not start to spread to other areas of language until the 1st century AD.35 It is also impos-
sible to assume that Greek philosophy had such a considerable infl uence on the Roman 
mentality in the Archaic Period.36 However, as G. Franciosi noted, the archaic hereditas 
was not understood as a res corporalis. A thing is corporalis in relation to another one, 
which is incorporalis and vice versa; such a distinction cannot be applied in a period 
when it did not exist.37 Therefore, a serious question arises as to how the hereditas could 
become the subject of usucapion during the period when the juristic thought did not yet 
function on a suffi  ciently abstract level to be able to make such a distinction. It seems 
that in the Archaic Period the hereditas could not be understood as an immaterial entity, 
a separate whole which was possible to usucapt, since even Cicero in the 1st century AD 
sees things inaccessible to the senses as, in a way, non-existing (non esse)38:
Cic. Top. 5.27: Esse ea dico quae cerni tangique possunt, ut fundum aedes, parietem stillicidium, 
mancipium pecudem, supellectilem penus et cetera […]. Non esse rursus ea dico quae tangi demon-
strarive non possunt, cerni tamen animo atque intellegi possunt, ut si usus capionem, si tutelam, si 
gentem, si agnationem defi nias, quarum rerum nullum subest [quasi] corpus, est tamen quaedam 
conformatio insignita et impressa intellegentia, quam notionem voco.39
32  G. 2.14 pr.: Incorporales sunt quae tangi non possunt, qualia sunt ea quae in iure consistunt, sicut 
hereditas ususfructus obligationes quoquo modo contractae. “Incorporeal are things that are intangible, such 
as exist merely in law, for example an inheritance, a usufruct, obligations however contracted”.
33  Getting ahead of our line of argument, it should be said that archaic usucapio pro herede was probably 
created after the Law of the Twelve Tables was passed, during the activity of the pontifi cal jurisprudence.
34  W. Dajczak, Rzymska res incorporalis a kształtowanie się pojęć «rzeczy» i «przedmiotu praw rzeczo-
wych» w europejskiej nauce prawa prywatnego, Poznań 2007, p. 23.
35  Ibidem, p. 42.
36  Cf. W. Litewski, Jurysprudencja…, p. 102: “Generally, from the mid-2nd century BC onwards the 
educated Romans were versed in philosophy”.
37  G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 39.
38  W. Dajczak, Rzymska res incorporalis…, p. 25.
39  The text was quoted in: M. Tulli Ciceronis Rhetorica, vol. 2, ed. A.S. Wilkins, Oxford 1903.
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By things that exist I mean such as can be seen and touched: for example, farm, house, wall, rain-
water, slave, animal, furniture, food etc. [...] On the other hand, by things which do not exist I mean 
those which cannot be touched or pointed out, but can, for all that, be perceived by the mind and 
comprehended; for example, you might defi ne acquisition by long possession, guardianship, gens, 
agnation; of these things there is no body, but a clear pattern and understanding impressed on the 
mind, and this I call a notion.40
Another intuition which may come in handy when answering the question about the 
understanding of the hereditas as the subject of usucapion is the case of a herd as a single 
object of law, which appears in jurists’ refl ections.41 Elsewhere in The Institutes, in a sec-
tion on the per legis actiones proceedings, we will fi nd a fragment on the fact that in the 
vindicatio process the claimed thing had to be brought in by the praetor; if this was in-
convenient, at least a piece or fragment of the thing had to be brought in.42 This example 
proves that at least during the time the per legis actiones proceedingsfunctioned, a herd 
could be the subject of the vindicatio process. According to Jürgen Hammerstein, this 
diff erent treatment of a herd of cattle stemmed from the economic practice in Archaic 
Rome.43 This treatment of a herd was an exception, however, as a similar solution would 
not have been practical for other sets of things.44 It did not, in any way, follow from the 
infl uence of Greek philosophy, e.g. Stoicism. On the contrary, it precedes its infl uence on 
Roman society by a few centuries.45 We can therefore ask whether the hereditas was not 
treated in an analogous way, i.e. whether the economic need did not force the treatment 
of things belonging to an inheritance as one set. This hypothesis is probably baseless. 
Firstly, there are no sources to support such an analogy. Secondly, if we assume the sec-
ondary nature of acquiring the hereditas to acquiring the title of heres, this hypothesis 
would be contrary to this assumption, placing the spotlight on the former element.
G. Franciosi proposes an interesting and convincing solution to this problem. He 
disagrees with the opinion that the hereditas was originally a set of things or that it was 
understood as a res corporalis.46 The Italian Romanist instead emphasises personal ele-
ments of both usucapion (in the archaic version as simple usus) and succession. Firstly, 
he shows that what was obtained through usus was not abstract ownership but the per-
sonal use of a thing.47 Moreover, Roman law in its oldest version made it possible to hold 
personal power over people as well. As his key argument, G. Franciosi quotes marriage 
accompanied by obtaining the manus over the wife through usus. Remarkably, the period 
40  English translation: Cicero, De inventione. De optimo genere oratorum. Topica, with an English 
translation by H.M. Hubbel, London 1960.
41  See: W. Dajczak, Rzymska res incorporalis…, p. 50 ff .
42  G. 4.17: Si qua res talis erat, ut sine incommodo non posset in ius adferri vel adduci, veluti si columna 
aut navis aut grex alicuius pecoris esset […]. “If the thing was such as could not be carried or led into court 
without inconvenience – for example, if it was a column or a ship or a fl ock or herd […]”.
43  W. Dajczak, Rzymska res incorporalis…, p. 55.
44  J. Hammerstein, Die Herde im römischen Recht. Grex als rechtliche Sachgesamntheit und Wirtschafts-
einheit, Göttingen 1975, p. 11. Quoted and examined in: W. Dajczak, Rzymska res incorporalis…, p. 55.
45  W. Dajczak, Rzymska res incorporalis…, p. 54.
46  The view was especially supported by B. Albanese. According to him, the change from archaic to 
classical usucapio pro herede consisted in altering the idea of the hereditas from corporalis to incorporalis. 
Quoted in G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 167 ff .
47  Ibidem, p. 181.
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of this peculiar “usucapion” was also a year, similarly to the typical usucapion of a thing 
or the hereditas. Incidentally, this proves the ancient origin of usus with a one-year pe-
riod (also as a prototype of usucapio pro herede), older than the Law of the Twelve 
Tables. The Law on the one hand assumes the possibility of entering a marriage in this 
way and extending the husband’s manus to his wife, and it only introduces the institution 
of usurpatio trinoctii, which enabled the wife to purposefully not become the subject of 
“usucapion” and not come under her husband’s power.48 On the other hand, Franciosi 
argues, if an inheritance included only individual inherited things, and the hereditas was 
possibly understood as a single set of such things, it would still fail to explain the phe-
nomenon of the deceased’s obligations and sacra passing to the heres.49
Among the motives for introducing ancient usucapio pro herede, Gaius especially 
emphasises the historical signifi cance of the continuity of the domestic cult (G. 2.55: 
[…] quorum illis temporibus summa observatio fuit). The cult is so important that the 
hereditas cannot exist without it.50 These two examples clearly show the priority of per-
sonal over fi nancial elements in inheritance in the Archaic Period, and the hereditas 
should be understood as an extension of the personal situation de cuius. Combining the 
two arguments: since the heres – by accepting the title – obtains the testator’s entire per-
sonal situation (rather than only acquiring res hereditariae), consequently the hereditas 
as the entire personal situation of the deceased may be the subject of usus in the form of 
archaic usucapio pro herede. It seems, therefore, that a similar reading of the hereditas 
enables us to avoid its anachronistic understanding in the categories of res corporalis 
and res incorporalis. Their alternative emerged much later, after all. In this understand-
ing, claims G. Franciosi, the hereditas was neither res corporalis nor res incorporalis.51
The question remains why – despite the fundamental change in the model of usuca-
pion from archaic to classical – the new institution maintained the previous period of 
one year. After all, in the classical model it no longer has a logical basis with regard to 
usucapion of immovables belonging to the inheritance, which would normally require 
a two-year period. This longer period does ensure more eff ective protection of the heir’s 
interests. However, Gaius does not justify this in any way. He only specifi es that the 
one-year period of usucapion was binding in previous, archaic usucapio. Clearly, for 
the Roman jurist the status quo was a suffi  cient argument for maintaining it.52 At the 
48  G. 1.111: Itaque lege XII tabularum cautum est, ut si qua nollet eo modo in manum mariti convenire, 
ea quotannis trinoctio abesset atque eo modo <usum> cuiusque anni interrumperet. “Hence it was provided 
by the Twelve Tables that any woman wishing not to come under her husband’s manus in this way should stay 
away from him for three nights in each year and thus interrupt the usus of each year”.
49  G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 34 ff .
50  As an orally-transmitted principle nulla hereditas sine sacris. W. Litewski, Jurysprudencja…, p. 122, 
without quoting sources.
51  G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 184.
52  A similar example of conservatism characteristic for the Roman jurisprudence can be found in the 
senatus consultum of 49 AD, in which Emperor Claudius permitted an uncle to marry his niece, lifting the 
prohibition against marriage between relatives up to the fourth degree of kinship. The reason for the decree 
were Claudius’ private plans with regard to such a marriage. The decree remained in force in this – fragmen-
tary, casuistic – form for almost three centuries. Cf. W. Dajczak, T. Giaro, F. Longchamps de Bérier, Prawo 
rzymskie…, p. 217.
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same time, this point clearly shows that the Romans lacked the propensity for creating 
a system53 – even Gaius, who, as a teacher, had a fondness for creating new distinctions.54
The purposes of introducing and changing the model of usucapio 
pro herede
In the next fragment, the jurist presents the purposes of introducing the institution in 
question:
G. 2.55: Quare autem omnino tam inproba possessio et usucapio concessa sit, illa ratio est, quod 
uoluerunt ueteres maturius hereditates adiri, ut essent, qui sacra facerent, quorum illis temporibus 
summa obseruatio fuit, ut et creditores haberent, a quo suum consequerentur. 56. Haec autem spe-
cies possessionis et usucapionis etiam lucratiua uocatur: nam sciens quisque rem alienam lucri 
facit.
That so dishonest a possession and usucapion should have been allowed at all is explained by the 
fact that the ancient lawyers wished inheritances to be accepted promptly, in order that there should 
be persons to carry on the family cults (sacra), to which the greatest importance was attached in 
those days, and in order that the creditors (of the inheritance) should have someone from whom to 
obtain their due. This kind of possession and usucapion is also termed lucrativa (gainful), because 
by it a man knowingly makes gain out of another’s property.
The very beginning of the quoted fragment includes a strong expression, which en-
ables us to guess how Gaius’ readers and himself see the institution of usucapio pro 
herede: it is dishonourable (inproba). Another word which Gaius uses to describe the 
institution is the adjective lucrativa. The profi t in question is not ethically neutral, since 
lucrum in the understanding of Roman jurists is, according to Jerzy Krzynówek, “an un-
due, undeserved profi t, which is subject to a return or division, and which follows from 
a legal act or emerges in relation to a contract or a legal act”.55 This is a very defi nitive 
moral evaluation. It seems that it is mainly based on the possibility of depriving the heres 
extraneus of the entire inheritance during a short period of usucapion, especially if he is 
far away from the location of the estate or does not know about his appointment to inher-
itance. Why and how, then, was such a faulty institution created at all? Clearly the mo-
tives which gave an impulse to its creation overcame the disadvantages of this solution, 
or else serious drawbacks appeared later on. First of all, in his evaluation Gaius does 
not distinguish between the functioning of archaic and classical usucapio pro herede, 
or alternatively deliberately evaluates both these forms as inproba. In my opinion, there 
are no suffi  cient grounds to hold such a strict opinion about the consequences of archaic 
usucapio. It is more likely that the author extended his opinion about the institution con-
temporary to him to the past.
53  Ibidem, pp. 67–68.
54  W. Litewski, Jurysprudencja…, pp. 111, 142.
55  J. Krzynówek, Uwagi…, p. 153.
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According to Gaius, it was the veteres who started the institution. The term refers 
to the old, probably pontifi cal, jurisprudence.56 A more precise dating of the introduc-
tion of archaic usucapio pro herede is impossible on the basis of the available sources. 
The French scholar Pierre Collinet estimated that it emerged in the 2nd century BC.57 
G. Franciosi, on the other hand, gives only the general terminus ad quem, dated to the 
pontifi cate of Tiberius Coruncanius (254 BC).58 Pasquale Voci considers this pontifi cate 
to be the probable time when the institution in question was created.59
Continuing on from the chronological refl ections, we can smoothly advance towards 
the motives of the introduction. While the dating of the introduction of archaic usucapio 
is (like the vast majority of problems concerning archaic law) doomed to more or less 
correct guessing, the analogous discussion about the change of its model to the classi-
cal one is based on more solid foundations. In their debates, Romanists frequently off er 
arguments related both to the appearance or existence of the above-mentioned motives 
in Roman society (which would supposedly give rise to the archaic form of usucapio 
pro herede) and to their termination (which would supposedly lead to the change of the 
model). Let us therefore turn to the motives which drove the veteres to introduce the in-
stitution of usucapio pro herede. Gaius is very specifi c on this point: the veteres desired 
that inheritances should be accepted quickly, that domestic cults should be continued, 
and that creditors might have someone from whom they might collect their claims.
Numerous prominent Romanists raise various objections against Gaius’ account on
the subject.60 Firstly, they note the time diff erence between the hypothetical period
of the creation of archaic usucapio pro herede and the time of Gaius’ activity. According 
to some, so many years had passed that the motives cited by the author of The Institutes 
seem to be a case of a rationalising anachronism: it is interesting, but it in no way refl ects 
reality.61 Others belittle the signifi cance of the individual motives cited by Gaius for intro-
ducing the institution of archaic usucapio pro herede consistent with his description. Siro 
Solazzi raises a particularly serious doubt, openly stating that “usucapio pro herede was 
not introduced so that inheritance could be accepted faster”.62 There were other motives 
behind it. Many others speak less directly about a disproportion between the declared 
56  E.g. P. Voci, Modi di acquisto…, p. 200; G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, pp. 16–17, 22–23. Pietro Bonfante, 
on the other hand, believes that the roots of the institution go back to the times before the Law of the Twelve 
Tables: P. Bonfante, La “iusta causa” dell’usucapione e il suo rapporto colla “bona fi des” [in:] idem, Scritti 
giuridici varii, vol. 2, Torino 1918, p. 492. Gennaro Franciosi notes fi rst of all that usucapio pro herede 
assumes the existence of the institution of heres extraneus, which was not introduced until the Law of the 
Twelve Tables.
57  P. Collinet, Les variations de l’usucapion “pro herede” avant Hadrien [in:] Studi in onore di Salvatore 
Riccobono nel XL anno del suo insegnamento, vol. 4, Palermo 1936, p. 141.
58  G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 19.
59  P. Voci, Diritto ereditario romano, vol. 1, Milano 1960, p. 120.
60  Very extensive polemic literature on the subject in: G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 54.
61  Pietro Bonfante expresses such an opinion the most strongly, refusing to ascribe any historical value 
to Gaius’ explanations. Cf. P. Bonfante, Corso di diritto romano, vol. 6: Le successioni. Parte generale, Roma 
1930, p. 224.
62  S. Solazzi, Diritto ereditario romano, vol. 1, Napoli 1932, p. 140.
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purpose (faster acceptance of an inheritance) and the means applied.63 Pietro Bonfante’s 
ironic statement does sound very provocative indeed:
It is absurd to claim that in order to accept [an inheritance], rather than using a direct method, such 
as […] setting a time limit, the Romans would allow dispossessing [heirs] of inheritance and design 
such a complete institution, only to destroy it little by little later, in the historical period.64
This pointed statement basically summarises the main complaints against the ration-
ality of the motives given by Gaius. Rudolf von Jhering and Bernardo Albanese also 
believed that it would have been suffi  cient to set a time limit for accepting an inherit-
ance in order to accelerate its acceptance, without the need to resort to more drastic 
methods.65 It seems that such a solution was not as simple and obvious to the veteres. 
As Biondo Biondi holds, in the Archaic Period the law, praetor and jurisprudence (let 
us note: the pontifi cal jurisprudence, i.e. one dealing largely with public laws) did not 
have direct power over private relations yet and were unable to set such a time limit.66 
Apart from this technical problem, G. Franciosi defends Gaius’ opinion from the point 
of view of its content. The Italian scholar was convinced that the Romanists mentioned 
above did not suffi  ciently take into account the importance of the continuation of the do-
mestic cult. Meanwhile, although the order of inheritance followed from the Law of the 
Twelve Tables, the infl uence of the pontifi cal jurisprudence on the issue of inheritance 
was mainly refl ected in the regulation of the inheritance of the sacra. Therefore, if we 
assume that the creators of usucapion in place of an heir, the veteres, were the pontiff s, it 
is rational to assume that their main motivation was concern for the cult. Moreover, set-
ting a time limit for accepting an inheritance, even regardless of the technical issues dis-
cussed by B. Biondi, did not solve this problem because if the time limit was exceeded, 
the inheritance remained vacant and the cult of the deceased’s family was abandoned. 
The only solution was to fi nd a heres at any cost, or rather to appoint a heres by law, us-
ing accomplished facts, even at the expense of potentially wronging the heres extraneus 
appointed by the testator.
Additionally, there have been various opinions about other motives for introducing 
usucapio pro herede, not included in Gaius’ text. S. Solazzi, quoted above, noted that 
according to the Law of the Twelve Tables in the case of an intestate inheritance neither 
the agnatus proximus nor the gentiles obtained the title of heres, but only of ius familiae 
habendae.67 Therefore, they did not become responsible for performing the domestic cult 
of the deceased. According to this author, usucapio was introduced so that after a year of
holding the familia either the agnatus proximus or the gentiles could obtain the title
63  S. Solazzi, Diritto…, p. 60; P. Collinet, Les variations…, p. 137; B. Albanese, La successione…, 
p. 282.
64  P. Bonfante, Corso…, p. 226.
65  R. Jhering, Serio e faceto nella giurisprudenza, Firenze 1954, p. 161; B. Albanese, La successione…, 
p. 282.
66  B. Biondi, Istituti fondamentali di diritto ereditario romano. Capacità, acquisto dell’eredità ed eff etti, 
divisione, Milano 1948, p. 116.
67  T. 5.4–5.
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of heir.68 This opinion was frowned upon by other Romanists69 mainly because there are 
no suffi  cient sources to establish if usucapio pro herede had any limitations ratione per-
sonae. Without such a restriction the institution of usucapion in place of an heir would 
seem inadequate to the purpose assumed by S. Solazzi. Pietro Bonfante presented the 
following viewpoint: an extraneus, i.e. a person from outside the family, taking actual 
charge of the familia was a kind of usurpation. With the development of the state appa-
ratus this usurpation may have, with the passage of time, transformed into the legal title 
of heres.70 As to the principle, it is diffi  cult to disagree with this opinion, if we look at 
the institution of usucapion in general. The purpose of usucapion, after all, was to legiti-
mise the status quo which diff ered from the legal status, whether for material or formal 
reasons.71 This hypothesis would include all types of usucapion (not only the pro herede 
type), and it would be idle and quite banal. According to some Romanists, P. Bonfante 
incorrectly looked for political reasons to explain certain symptoms of the development 
of Roman law in the Archaic Period, i.e. in an area with the least amount of available 
source documents.72 B. Biondi noted that “in no political organism is it considered nor-
mal that someone takes over unassigned power with full legal eff ect; it may happen as an 
exception and through accomplished facts, but the law cannot stipulate and regulate it”.73 
Some critical remarks towards P. Bonfante’s positivism, characterised by an evolution-
ist or dialectic attitude towards the history of law, were also included in G. Franciosi’s 
monograph.74
Keeping rather closely to Gaius’ interpretation and the content included explicitly 
in his text, the main purpose of introducing the institution in question was to entice the 
heredes instituted in testaments to accept the inheritance as quickly as possible (matu-
rius hereditates adiri), i.e. fi nding the heres and forcing him to act. It seems that in no 
period did this purpose become obsolete: even after the subject of usucapio pro herede 
was changed to res hereditariae, the presence of a heres remained necessary, for instance 
as the condition of the eff ectiveness of legacies and fi deicomissa. This motive is clearly 
diff erent from the other two, both on the functional and linguistic level. Firstly, accept-
ing the inheritance (aditio) is the basis of achieving the other two purposes, which are 
cultivating the domestic sacra and the heir becoming liable to the creditors’ execution. 
Secondly, in G. 2.55 the Latin syntax uses a diff erent construction to refer to the fi rst pur-
pose than to the other two. The fi rst purpose is expressed by using the ACI (accusativus 
cum infi nitivo) construction, which was very popular in Classical Latin.75 The other two 
68  S. Solazzi, Diritto…, p. 62. In Polish literature, this opinion is shared by Jerzy Krzynówek. Cf. 
J. Krzynówek, Uwagi…, pp. 159–160.
69  For more on this subject see G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 66; G. Coppola Bisazza, Studi…, p. 94 ff .
70  P. Bonfante, Corso…, p. 227; idem, Le critiche al concetto dell’originaria eredità sovrana [in:] idem, 
Scritti giuridici varii, vol. 1: Famiglia e succesione, Torino 1916, p. 242.
71  W. Dajczak, T. Giaro, F. Longchamps de Bérier, Prawo rzymskie…, p. 384.
72  G.I. Luzzato, Le organizzazioni preciviche e lo Stato, Modena 1948, p. 7; G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, 
p. 68.
73  B. Biondi, Istituti…, p. 117.
74  G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 69.
75  ACI construction analysis: voluerunt – predicate, so-called verbum regens; veteres – subject; heredi-
tates – accusativus; adiri – infi nitivus. 
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purposes, on the other hand, were expressed in two clauses of purpose, subordinate to the 
clause with the ACI: ut essent […] et ut haberent […]. The word ut is a conjunction with 
a multitude of uses, one of which is to introduce a clause of purpose, i.e. the so called 
ut of purpose. The diff erence in constructions itself does not necessarily determine the 
importance of one of the clauses. However, the text undoubtedly shows the sacra and 
the creditors as the motives which are somehow parallel to each other, which in conjunc-
tion with the functional interpretation allows us to conclude that they are secondary to 
the main purpose, which remains fi nding the heres as quickly as possible. However, it 
is also possible to treat fi nding the heres not as the main purpose but as the instrumental 
one, which serves the other two. Gaius himself draws particular attention to the excep-
tional respect that the sacra enjoyed in the times when usucapio was introduced (summa 
observatio). When the sacra lose their special position in Roman society, the argumenta-
tion of the authors quoted above (that usucapio pro herede uses too drastic methods to 
ensure the simple purpose of a quicker acceptance of an inheritance and thus the subject 
of usucapion changes to the res hereditariae) will become valid.
It is now worth devoting some close attention to the Roman domestic cult. After the 
paths of religious law and civil law diverged,76 jurists did not show interest in the former. 
From that moment onwards, the sacra were commonly treated as a traditional burden 
imposed on the heir, which could even exceed the value of the inheritance, if the latter 
was exhausted by legacies (or later by classical usucapio pro herede). This particular 
relation between inheritance and the sacra is perhaps best explained by the saying which 
functioned in Rome, recorded by Festus, among others77:
De verborum signifi catu 370: Sine sacris hereditas: sine sacris hereditas in proverbio dici solet […] 
sine ulla incommodi appendice.78
On the signifi cance of words 370: An inheritance without rites: proverbially, a benefi t without any 
inconvenient appendices used to be called “an inheritance without rites”.
Festus’ sentence indicates a natural connection between inheritance and the transfer 
of cult. It assumes that the hereditas functions normally cum sacris, while their lack is 
something special, something that draws attention. Secondly, the sacra are talked about 
clearly as an addition, a secondary element, which is also disadvantageous, inconven-
ient, incommodum. It is far from the summa observatio mentioned by Gaius.
To capture the change and to understand this connection, we must refer to Cicero’s 
famous text in De legibus (2.19–20, 47–49). In his work, modelled after Plato’s Nomoi, 
the Arpinate depicts the image of ideal law, or more precisely, the law of an ideal Roman 
republic. In the second book, he devotes a long fragment to religious law, including the 
principles of continuing the sacra. Very importantly, the author presents those principles 
as his own, although earlier he ascribed them to Quintus Mucius Scævola, son of Publius 
Mucius Scævola the Pontifex. He compares them to the previous principles of passing 
76  W. Litewski, Jurysprudencja…, pp. 19, 23.
77  The connections between the sacra and the hereditas are also shown in other non-legal accounts: 
Plaut. Capt. 775; Plaut. Trin. 484; Cic. Dom. 13.35; Plin. Paneg. 37.2.
78  According to: Sexti Pompei Festi De verborum signifi catu quae supersunt cum Pauli epitome. 
Thewrewkianis copiis usus, ed. W.M. Lindsay, Lipsiae 1913.
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down the domestic cult, formulated by nameless pontifi ces. These principles in particular 
are an invaluable testimony of the infl uence of the pontifi cal jurisprudence on the inher-
itance of the sacra. A comparison of the two successive orders of passing the domestic 
cult may be helpful for establishing the moment when the model of usucapio pro herede 
changed. The modifi cations of the order of passing the cult are the oldest testimony on 
whose basis it can be guessed until which moment in the development of the law the 
usucaptor pro herede was perceived as an heir (archaic usucapio), and when he was seen 
as an independent benefi ciary of a part of the inheritance (classical usucapio).
As Giuseppe Gandolfi  notes, the basic principle of the sacra in Cicero’s text is not 
their nature or purpose, but the proclamation of their, so to say, perpetuality79:
Cic., Leg. 2.9.22: Sacra privata perpetua manento.
The sacred rites of families shall remain for ever.80
Cic., Leg. 2.19.47: De sacris autem […], haec sit una sententia, ut conserventur semper et deinceps 
familiis prodantur et, ut in lege posui, perpetua sint sacra.
[...] these rites shall ever be preserved and continuously handed down in families, and, as I said in 
my law, that they must be continued for ever.
As we can see, the other principles regulating the continuation of the cult play an 
auxiliary role to their perpetuality, which is assumed as an axiom. The fi rst method used 
to this end was passing the cult observed by the deceased to his familia. Each Roman 
family had its own separate cult, and leaving the family – for instance as a result of adop-
tion by another one – resulted in abandoning the cult.81 Before the introduction of the in-
stitution of heres extraneus, the only way a person from outside the family could receive 
an inheritance was adoption and therefore involving the person in the domestic cult.82 
This solution gradually lost its popularity due to some deep changes of Roman society. 
The mancipatio familiae turned out to be such a revolutionary change, which in fact 
deprived the hereditas of any signifi cant meaning. The mancipatio familiae enabled the 
estate to be handed down to a person chosen by the potential testator, without the need to 
burden the benefi ciary with the domestic cult. New circumstances posed an increasingly 
large threat to the continuation of the sacra of each family, which forced the College 
of Pontiff s to intervene. Much earlier, archaic usucapio pro herede was supposed to be 
a similar intervention in defence of the continuity of the sacra. It must be admitted that 
the source material does not allow us to date the beginning of these institutions, which 
vanished in the darkness of the ancient past. At one point, the pontifi ces formulated the 
so-called pecuniary principle (principio pecuniario in Italian studies of Ancient Rome), 
defi ned by Cicero in these words:
79  G. Gandolfi , Sulla evoluzione della “hereditas” alla luce del regime dei “sacra”, SDHI 1955, vol. 
21, p. 225.
80  This and the following English translations of Cicero’s Topica quoted from: Cicero, De re publica. De 
legibus, with an English translation by C.W. Keyes, London 1959.
81  Ibidem, p. 229.
82  Ibidem, p. 243; G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 94. 
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Cic., Leg. 2.19.48: Hoc posito haec iura pontifi cum auctoritate consecuta sunt, ut, ne morte pa-
tris familias sacrorum memoria occideret, iis essent ea adiuncta ad quos eiusdem morte pecunia 
 venerit.
Clearly our present laws on the subject have been laid down by the authority of the pontiff s, in order 
that the performacne of the rites may be imposed upon those to whom the property passes, so that 
the memory of tchem may not die out at the death of the father of the family.
According to Cicero’s words, the pecuniary principle is the concretisation (hoc 
posito […] consecuta sunt) of the general principle of perpetual continuation of 
the sacra.83 It consists in linking the domestic cult to the estate left by the deceased
the former follows the latter. Such a solution makes it possible to assign the cult to 
a non-heir, who obtained the estate e.g. by means of mancipatio familiae. It is worth 
noting that the solution has the characteristics of a temporary stage in the evolution of 
the attitude towards the sacra. On the one hand, they were still a value towards which 
a legal solution was to lead; on the other hand, they were clearly on the defensive in 
the face of the secularisation of the law (cf. the phrase sine sacris hereditas). Further 
concretisation consists in identifying the specifi c persons responsible for performing 
the cult:
Cic., Leg. 2.20.49: […] Nam illi quidem his verbis docebant: tribus modis sacris adstringitur: 
hereditate, aut si maiorem partem pecuniae capiat, aut si maior pars pecuniae legata est, si inde 
quippiam ceperit.
For their rule was expressed in the following terms: that men are bound to perform the rites in three 
diff erent ways, either by being heirs, or by receiving the greater part of the property, or, in case the 
greater part of the property was bequeathed in legacies, by receiving anything whatever by that 
means.
This fragment is believed to be a record of a tradition of the pontifi cal law older than 
Scævola.84 A precise dating is diffi  cult. Traditional Romanists held that the author of 
these words was Tiberius Coruncanius (the pontifex maximus of 253 BC).85 The basis for 
this opinion was another fragment from Cicero, in which the author refers to the famous 
pontiff :
Cic., Leg. 2.21.52: Placuit P. Scevolae et Ti. Coruncanio, pontifi cibus maximis, itemque ceteris eos, 
qui tantundem caperent, quantum omnes heredes, sacris allegari. […]
Publius Scaevola, Tiberius Coruncanius, and other supreme pontiff s have decided that those who 
received as much as all the heirs together were bound to the rites.
83  Cf. J. Zabłocki, Kompetencje patres familias i zgromadzeń ludowych w sprawach rodziny w świetle 
Noctes Atticae Aulusa Gelliusa, Warszawa 1990, p. 90.
84  The nature of this statement was controversial in scholarship. Giuseppe Gandoli is most convincing 
on the subject when he says that this is a responsum based on the authority of the pontifi cal jurists, although 
it does not lack the value of normativity in the face of the pontiff s’ monopoly on the interpretation of reli-
gious law (G. Gandoli, Sulla evoluzione…, p. 228). An older doctrine talked about an “edict” (P. Bonfante, 
Corso…, p. 103) or “ruling” (S. Solazzi, Diritto…, p. 108). From this point on I will call it the “response of 
the pontiff s”.
85  G. Gandoli, Sulla evoluzione…, p. 226.
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According to Giuseppe Gandolfi , the principle contained in the above sentence is 
a modifi cation of the order from the pontiff s’ response, which is why the author dates this 
response to the time shortly before Coruncanius, who supposedly made the change.86 It 
seems, however, that G. Franciosi is right to defend the traditional view.87 He points out 
that Cicero, who was not a jurist, only passed down a certain tradition. Therefore, we 
should assume a certain path which was followed from the time when the pontiff s’ re-
sponse was created to the time when it was passed down in the orator’s work. If we read 
the sentence literally, it seems to be talking about the mentioned fi gures as collaborating, 
or at least contemporaneous to each other. In fact, Publius Mucius Scævola was a consul 
in 133 BC, and the pontifex maximus in 134 BC. This would mean that Cicero used terms 
characteristic for his own times to express the pecuniary principle as unchanged whereas 
in fact it had undergone an evolution; it was originally formulated by Coruncanius as 
maior pars, then reworked in the light of the lex Voconia by Publius Mucius Scævola
as a tantundem. In any case, the pontiff s’ response in its original form can probably be 
dated to the fi rst half of the 3rd century BC.
Many scholars have examined the issues contained in the famous passage,88 but focus-
ing on the subject of the sacra and the pontifi cal jurisprudence’s views on the individual 
clauses of this and the next response, paying more attention only to the problems which 
throw direct light on usucapio pro herede. The text clearly distinguishes three ways of 
assigning someone responsibility for the sacra of a deceased person. Firstly, the sacra 
descended to the heirs, without any distinctions, i.e. including the heirs from outside 
the family – heredes extranei.89 In the context of the other two groups, it can be seen 
that the fi rst group was not subject to the pecuniary principle: the heir was responsible
for the sacra regardless of accepting or rejecting the inheritance. Generally speaking, 
there are no doctrinal disputes on this point. This is not the case of the next clause, which 
is of particular interest to us: as G. Gandolfi  admits, “it is unclear to what situation the 
pontifi cal norm refers”.90 The text of the clause speaks very generally about “taking as 
much as the heirs”. What does this “taking” or “seizing” (capere) mean? Various authors 
suggest various confi gurations which, in their opinion, the text refers to: usucapio pro 
herede,91 bonorum possessio,92 familiae emptor,93 donatio mortis causa,94 and fi nally all 
86  Ibidem, p. 226. G. Coppola Bisazza, Studi…, pp. 140–141 expresses the same opinion.
87  G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 135 ff . The author defends the view that Coruncanius introduced the 
pecuniary principle, but in the maior pars formula from the pontiff s’ response, while the wording of the tan-
tundem is a record of a later tradition, referring to and dependent on the lex Voconia of 169 BC.
88  Cf. the extensive literature in: G. Gandoli, Sulla evoluzione…, p. 226, G. Coppola Bisazza, Studi…, 
p. 76 ff .
89  According to G. Gandolfi , at fi rst glance we can talk about this clause being superfl uous, since the heir 
accepted the sacra as a family member even before the response was issued. Therefore, in his opinion, this 
clause was included to clearly specify heres extraneus. Ibidem, p. 231.
90  Ibidem, p. 233.
91  P. Bonfante, Corso…, p. 107.
92  F.C. Savigny, Juristische Behandlung der “Sacra privata” [in:] idem, Vermischte Schriften, vol. 1, 
Berlin 1850, p. 153; E. Costa, Cicerone giureconsulto, vol. 1, Bologna 1927, p. 242.
93  Ch. Appleton, Le testament romain. La méthode du droit comparé et l’authenticité la méthode du droit 
comparé et l’authenticité des XII tables, Paris 1903, p. 108.
94  K. Karlowa, Romische Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 2, Leipzig 1901, p. 902.
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possibilities of acquiring the inheritance without obtaining the title of heir.95 It is evident 
that the question about the sense of this clause is fundamental for placing the change of 
the model of usucapio in time. If we share the opinion of the traditional doctrine, it will 
mean that this is the fi rst time in the sources that the usucaptor pro herede was considered 
to be a person diff erent from the heres (who is included in the fi rst clause). Following 
from this, usucapio pro herede from this moment on does not entail obtaining this title, 
so it only concerns the things belonging to the inheritance (the classical model). The 
remaining hypotheses are of no great signifi cance for this analysis. Suffi  ce it to say that 
some of them found no support from anyone besides their authors. G. Gandolfi  also 
shows certain helplessness towards the general nature of the text, endorsing S. Solazzi’s 
equally general view.96 According to the traditional opinion, the capiat included in the 
text is the abbreviated version of the word usucapiat.97 It is impossible to agree with 
such a reasoning. Firstly, the verb capere is used in the sense usucapere – “to usucapt” – 
only in the fragments that are considered to be interpolated,98 so such an interpretation 
is not supported by the critics of the source. Secondly, assuming a certain rationality of 
the writer of the pontiff s’ response (as an embodiment of a tradition), he would not have 
used the same words for meanings so diff erent that it would have obscured the message. 
Meanwhile, the word capere also appears in the third clause99 in the context of the lega-
tee with the largest share of the inheritance. In his responsibility for the sacra, he is lim-
ited only to the part proportionate to the property he actually acquired. It is clear that here 
the word capere appears in its common meaning of “take”, “seize”, “acquire” and not 
“usucapt”, which in any case would not have made the slightest sense here. Therefore, 
there is no suffi  cient source evidence to conclude that at the time of the pontiff s’ response 
the subject of usucapio pro herede was no longer the hereditas but res hereditariae. We 
should rather embrace the continuation of the status quo, i.e. archaic usucapio, which in 
this case was one of the ways of taking over the sacra in the fi rst place, as it still resulted 
in obtaining the title of heres and acquiring the hereditas. The third clause, as we have 
mentioned, concerned the legatee who was left the majority of the inheritance by the 
testator, if he did accept it.100
The response101 also concerns the principles of inheriting the sacra:
Cic., Leg. 2.19.48: Quaeruntur enim qui adstringantur sacris. Heredum causa iustissima est; nulla 
est enim persona quae ad vicem eius qui e vita emigrarit propius accedat. Deinde qui morte testa-
mentove eius tantundem capiat quantum omnes heredes […]. Tertio loco, si nemo sit heres, is qui 
95  S. Solazzi, Diritto…, p. 114.
96  G. Gandoli, Sulla evoluzione…, p. 235.
97  P. Bonfante, Corso…, p. 107.
98  G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 144 with bibliographical notes for: D. 41.2.26; D. 41.2.36; D. 41.2.43.
99  In the second clause in the form of coniunctivus praesentis activi, and in the third one as coniunctivus 
perfecti activi.
100  G. Gandolfi  (Sulla evoluzione…, pp. 238–240) holds an isolated opinion. According to him, the 
legatee could be responsible for the sacra regardless of the heres, also when there simply was no heir, e.g. 
he rejected the inheritance. Essentially, the legacy should then be forfeited. Gandolfi  claims that in order to 
protect the continuation of the cult the pontiff s could pass the sacra to the person who was supposed to take 
the maior pars pecuniae according to the testator’s intention, i.e. the legatee.
101  I will be referring to this as “Scævola’s response”.
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de bonis quae eius fuerint quom moritur usu ceperit plurimum possidendo. Quarto qui, si nemo 
sit qui ullam rem ceperit, de creditoribus eius plurimum servet. [49] Extrema illa persona est, ut, 
si is, qui ei qui mortuus sit pecuniam debuerit, nemini [qui] eam solverit, proinde habeatur quasi 
eam pecuniam ceperit. […] [20.50] Haec nos a Scaevola didicimus, non ita descripta ab antiquis.
For they attempt to fi x with exactness the persons who are bound to perform the 
rites. With respect to the heirs the requirement is altogether just; for no one else can 
more truly be said to take the place of the dead. Next comes the person who, either by 
a death-bed gift or a will, receives as much of the estate as all the heirs put together. [...] 
In the third place, if there is no heir, the man who acquires by possession the ownership 
of the greater part of the property of which the deceased died possessed is bound by the 
obligation. In the fourth place, if nobody acquires any of the property of the deceased, 
then the obligation falls upon that one of the creditors who retains most of the estate. In 
the last place of all stands any person who owed money to the deceased and never paid 
it to anyone, for his position is considered the same as if he had received that money 
from the estate. This is what we learn from Scaevola, but the doctrine of the older au-
thorities is diff erently stated.
This time, however, it is not a record of a nameless tradition, but the author ascribes 
it to Scævola, his teacher. Cicero names two Scævolae as his teachers: Quintus Mucius 
Scævola the Augur (consul of 117, died ca. 89 BC) and Quintus Mucius Scævola the 
Pontifex (consul of 95, died in 82 BC).102 Cicero’s account seems to refer to the latter.103 
Scævola’s response therefore talks about a situation later than the pontiff s’ response, in 
a way referring to it. The fi rst clause is identical, and the second in fact combines the 
second (morte) and the third (testamento) clause from the pontiff s’ response in a version 
expanded by Scævola (tantundem […] quantum omnes heredes).
The third clause, however, is a complete novelty. Like the following ones, it is only 
a conditional clause (si nemo sit heres). On the one hand, the sentence clearly talks about 
the person who takes a share of the deceased’s goods (de bonis quae eius fuerint quom 
moritur usu ceperit); on the other hand, this person is very clearly distinguished from the 
heir by the imposed condition and by the very separation from the fi rst clause. Therefore, 
this is the fi rst time in the sources that a person appears who usucapts things belonging 
to an inheritance (largest share of all the goods), who is not and will not become an 
heir, but is a special enough fi gure for the law to specify that he will be responsible for 
the deceased’s sacra if there is no heir. The only solution to this puzzle seems to be the 
fact that sacral law faced a problem: in some way, usucapio pro herede stopped leading 
to the title of heres. Earlier, in the archaic model, i.e. already in the pontiff s’ response, 
this kind of usucapio made it possible to continue the cult by creating a new heir. Now 
it stopped functioning in this way and this is why, in the face of the continuity of cults 
being under threat, the pontiff s intervened, increasing the group of persons who could 
potentially be obliged to observe the cult to include non-heirs. Undoubtedly, the third 
clause of Scævola’s response talks about usucapio pro herede in the classical form.104 
102  Cic. Lell. 1.1.
103  Cic. Leg. 2.20.50: Sed pontifi cem sequamur. “But let us follow the ponfi ff”.
104  Cf. also P. Bonfante, Corso…, p. 107; S. Solazzi, Diritto…, p. 111 (although somewhat ambiguous-
ly); P. Collinet, Les variations…, p. 144; P. Voci, Diritto…, vol. 1, p. 114; G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 154.
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It seems that the publication of Scævola’s response can be dated to the period between 
130 BC (the fi gure of Publius Scævola, who personifi es the formulation of the pecuniary 
principle in the tantundem version in Cicero’s text) and 82 BC (the death of the Scævola 
who recorded the fi nal form of the response in question according to Cicero’s account). 
The change must have been made before Scævola’s response was issued because the 
latter does not regulate the new version of the institution, but rather reacts to the already 
introduced changes with regard to the order of passing down the domestic cult. On the 
basis of comparing the two responses we can assume that the change of the model of 
usucapio pro herede occurred in the second half of the 3rd century BC or during the fi rst 
seven decades of the 2nd century BC.
Clauses four and fi ve are also completely new. They are both conditional, as they 
assume that usucapio pro herede from the previous sentence did not take place, and in-
directly also that no heir appeared. In a way they concern analogous situations: one talks 
about the creditor of the deceased, the other – about the deceased’s debtor. Moreover, 
Romanists are quite in agreement that putting the two together requires, or at least makes 
more probable, the existence of the institution of bonorum venditio, a universal execu-
tion in the form of an auction.105 This involves the creditor who received the greatest 
share (plurimum) of the property after the debtor’s death. The question arises as to how 
this creditor and not another was distinguished by receiving the plurimum. The clause 
also assumes the plurality of creditors (de creditoribus). Such a confi guration brings to 
mind the procedure of an auction of the deceased’s goods, similar to the bonorum ven-
ditio and probably its prototype.106 If there were multiple creditors, the inheritance was 
divided proportionately to the size of the debts. The pontifi cal jurisprudence reacted to 
this change of execution by placing the burden of the cult on the creditor who received 
the largest share as a result of the auction. Earlier, during archaic usucapio pro herede, 
such a solution was not necessary, because if the creditors helped themselves out and 
recovered their debt from the estate of the deceased, they became the deceased’s heirs 
after one year and as such were responsible for the sacra of their debtors.
In this way we have returned the third motive identifi ed by Gaius in G. 2.55: ut et 
creditores haberent, a quo suum consequerentur. Did archaic usucapio indeed ensure 
that creditors could eff ectively recover their debts? It seems that the answer to this ques-
tion is unclear, because creditors had to take into account the acquirement of the title 
of heir and the cult, which entailed some expenses. At the same time, they had a vested 
interest in the appearance of any other heres, because, let us recall, at that time execution 
was only personal. In this case it aff ected the heir. It is a perfect illustration of how the
law in the Archaic Period – whether with regard to execution or usucapion – placed
the personal element above the fi nancial one. However, if there was a possibility of real 
execution, the heir was no longer attractive to the creditors as the “subject of execu-
tion”, so it is unsurprising that creditors eagerly tried to avoid the obligation to take over 
the burdensome sacra. In spite of all, on the basis of Scævola’s response the “largest” 
105  G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 156 ff .
106  Cf. G. 4.34–35. The execution from the deceased’s estate seems to have existed already during the 
times of Scævola’s response, so ascribing the so-called formula Serviana to Servius Sulpicius Rufus is an 
anachronism. It is possible that the latter developed an institution which existed before his times into a more 
mature form. Cf. G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, pp. 192–193, 196.
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creditor was still supposed to acquire them as the one who received the largest share 
of the property according to the pecuniary principle. As Rudolf Jhering notes, such an 
application of this principle was in fact mechanical and unfair, because in the case of 
a proportional division this creditor gained the most but also lost the most, and thus did 
not recover everything.107 Therefore, Friedrich Karl von Savigny proposes a change in 
the text which consists in omitting the word de108: Quarto qui, si nemo sit qui ullam rem 
ceperit, [de] creditoribus eius plurimum servet. “Fourthly, if there be no heir or legatee 
who receives any thing, it binds the one who gains the largest share of the estate for his 
creditors”. In this case, the text refers rather to the bonorum emptor, who off ered the 
creditors the most as payment for the debts during an auction. Such an interpretation 
seems attractive since a bonorum emptor is regarded as the successor even of a living 
person, but it requires an arbitrary modifi cation of the text, which must be considered – 
as G. Franciosi put it – “a brutal mutilation”.109
While the clause of the creditor requires an auction, the last one, the clause of the 
debtor, assumes its absence. The text talks about a debtor who did not discharge the debt, 
and no one sought to recover the debt from him (nemini [qui] eam solverit). However, 
in the case of a bonorum venditio the bonorum emptor became the successor of the de-
ceased and as his creditor could seek to recover the debt from the debtor. The fragment 
seems to be talking about a nemo, i.e. taking into account that the person recovering 
the debt could be someone other than the heir. Therefore, if the debtor had no one to 
pay the debt to, the bonorum venditio probably did not take place at all, for instance due 
to the lack of inheritance assets. The last two clauses therefore complete the system of 
inheriting the sacra,110 competing against each other with regard to the new institution 
of real execution.
It turns out, therefore, that Gaius’ intuitions as to the motives of the introduction of 
usucapio pro herede expressed in G. 2.55 were probably correct, since changes of their 
bases also gave rise to changes in the very construction of the institution in question. 
While the quick acceptance of an inheritance by heirs always remained of a certain value 
as a special form of effi  cient legal dealings (maturius hereditates adiri), the other two 
motives underwent considerable changes. First of all, the religious element – the fam-
ily sacra (ut essent, qui sacra facerent) – which originally were the most important link 
between the testator and the heir (quorum […] summa observatio fuit), with time started 
to be seen as a kind of burden. The practice of passing down the estate without the sa-
cra (e.g. mancipatio familiae) forced representatives of the pontifi cal jurisprudence to 
formulate and develop the pecuniary principle, which, although intended to protect the 
inheritance of the cult in new social and economic conditions, still strengthened the un-
derstanding of the sacra as a secondary element, extraneous to the inherited estate in the 
hereditas. At one point, when the continuation of the cult of each family was no longer 
as valuable to the Romans, and secular jurists dealing solely with private law stopped 
being interested in religious law, the drastic model of archaic usucapio pro herede was 
107  R. Jhering, Serio…, p. 180.
108  F.C. Savigny, Juristiche Behandlung…, p. 166 ff .
109  G. Franciosi, Usucapio…, p. 157.
110  Ibidem, p. 161.
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abandoned. The eff ectiveness of archaic usucapio pro herede evolved in a similar way 
with regard to exhausting the claims of creditors (ut et creditores haberent, a quo suum 
consequerentur). Initially, due to the exclusiveness of personal execution, a person, not 
an estate, had to be found as the subject of exhaustion: namely the heir, especially since 
acquiring the res hereditariae put the creditor in danger of involuntarily acquiring the 
title of heres and the cult of de cuius. When the execution procedure developed and real 
execution was allowed, the same usucapio became an obstacle. Not only did it put the 
creditors of the deceased debtor in danger of carrying the burden of the domestic cult, 
if they recovered their debt from the inheritance on their own, but it also complicated 
the situation during and after the auction of the estate. This was because the only suc-
cessor from this point on was supposed to be the bonorum emptor, liable to creditors. 
Meanwhile, the previous model of usucapio posed the threat of a potentially unlimited 
number of coheredes appearing, if only they took any of the res hereditariae. It is clear 
that in the new circumstances and in the new system of values the advantages of usuca-
pio pro herede became more of an obstacle to legal dealings.
After this lengthy analysis of how archaic usucapio changed into the classical version 
and why, let us return to the next part of Gaius’ commentary, written during the Classical 
Period of Roman law:
G. 2.57: Sed hoc tempore iam non est lucratiua. Nam ex auctoritate Hadriani senatusconsultum 
factum est, ut tales usucapiones reuocarentur. Et ideo potest heres ab eo qui rem usucepit, heredi-
tatem petendo proinde eam rem consequi, atque si usucapta non esset. 58. Necessario tamen herede 
extante nihil ipso iure pro herede usucapi potest.
But at the present day it is no longer lucrativa. For a senatusconsult passed on the authority of 
Hadrian has provided for such usucapions to be revoked. Thus, by hereditatis petitio, the heir can 
recover the thing from him who has acquired it by usucapion, just as if it had not been so acquired. 
However, if an involuntary heir exists, no usucapion pro herede is possible even at civil law.
After the historical digression, the author returns to discussing the state contemporary 
to himself and his readers. Archaic usucapio, whose subject was the estate, is only a dis-
tant past. For over three centuries, it has concerned only res hereditariae, although the 
opinion about this institution is so awful (inproba) that the teacher felt obliged to explain 
to his students how it was created in the fi rst place. The vital characteristics of usucapio 
pro herede stopped being timely a long time before, and the change of the model turned 
out to be only a failed attempt to preserve tradition. Unsurprisingly, as it gradually ac-
quired such a bad moral opinion, it also received a poor legal assessment. Gaius writes 
about an unknown senatusconsultum enacted on Hadrian’s initiative, which stipulated 
that the heres could, by means of an action to recover the inheritance, claim the things 
usucapted pro herede as if the usucapion had never taken place. Therefore, a new fi cti-
tious state is introduced, a typical method of introducing changes in Roman law, not only 
the praetorian one.111 It is interesting that usucapio pro herede was not abolished at that 
time either. It was considered to be not only useless but even harmful, but still the heir 
was only given the possibility to contest it in a specifi c case. Perhaps this was a way to 
leave the door open for those inheritances in which heirs were not interested. It does not 
111  W. Dajczak, T. Giaro, F. Longchamps de Bérier, Prawo rzymskie…, p. 168.
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seem credible, however, because an inheritance has the same value both to the potential 
heir and to the usucaptor. Perhaps we should interpret this as a trait of the individual ini-
tiative, so characteristic for Roman law112: the heir himself must, after all, bring an action 
against usucapion that took place.
The epilogue of usucapio pro herede
This is all that Gaius has to say about usucapio pro herede. We have the opportunity to 
compare the two models only on the basis of his commentary. Without the discussed 
fragment of The Institutes, our knowledge about usucapion in place of an heir would be 
infi nitely poorer.113 We would not know either the archaic origin or the special character 
of this type of usucapion. During an analysis of the texts of Justinian’s compilation it will 
also appear that their interpretation would be altogether pointless if we did not have the 
opportunity to refer to the image depicted by the professor from the 2nd century BC. The 
reading of his text leaves us with the impression of usucapio pro herede as a dying, mere-
ly lingering institution. What we will not fi nd in Gaius’ writings is a description of the 
next stage of leaving usucapio behind. In the times of Marcus Aurelius (161–180 AD) 
a new crime was defi ned, called the crimen expilatae hereditatis.114 As S. Solazzi claims, 
such behaviour had been punished even earlier, by means of cognitio extra ordinem, 
on the basis of a custom confi rmed by the Emperor-Philosopher.115 In his monograph 
about the offi  ce of proconsul, Ulpian clearly states that the crimen expilatae hereditatis 
was in a sense an institution subsidiary to the actio furti.116 The punishment for this 
deed was lifelong or temporary public works, and for higher-born persons – temporary 
112  Cf. e.g. D. 47.10.7.5. in fi ne: […] nulla iniuria est, quae in volentem fi at “because there is no aff ront 
where the victim consents”; and D. 22.6.9.5, in fi ne: […] nec stultis solere succurri “that relief is granted to 
those who err, not to fools”.
113  According to Stanisław Wróblewski, Gaius is simply the jurist “to whom we owe almost everything 
we know about usucapio pro herede lucrativa”. Cf. S. Wróblewski, Usucapio…, p. 218.
114  D. 47.19.1. Marcianus, book 3 of The Institutes: Si quis alienam hereditatem expilaverit, extra ordi-
nem solet coerceri per accusationem expilatae hereditatis, sicut et oratione divi Marci cavetur. “If someone 
plunder the inheritance of another, he is to be punished by extraordinary process on being charged with such 
off ense, as is laid down in a proposal of the deifi ed Marcus”.
115  S. Solazzi, Sul crimen expilatae hereditatis [in:] idem, Scritti di diritto romano. III (1925–1937), 
Napoli 1960, p. 547. Solazzi claims so quoting the above fragment as well as C. 9.32.6. Philip.: Expilatae 
hereditatis crimen loco defi cientis actionis intendi consuevisse non est iuris ambigui. “It is a well-settled 
rule of law that the crime of plundering an estate can be prosecuted, even where a civil action for the same 
cause has failed”. (The Codex of Justinian: A New Annotated Translation with Parallel Latin and Greek Text, 
vol. 3, Books VIII–XII, general ed. B.W. Frier; eds. S. Connolly, S. Corcoran, M. Crawford, J.N. Dillon, D.P. 
Kehoe, N. Lenski, Th.A.J. McGinn, Ch.F. Pazdernik, B. Salway; with contr. by T. Kearley; based on a trans.
by J.F.H. Blume, Cambridge University Press, 2016). According to S. Solazzi, Emperor Philip would not 
have referred to a custom if Marcus Aurelius had introduced the crimen, and the failed civil action (actio 
defi ciens) was the actio furti.
116  D. 47.19.2.1. Ulpianus, book 9, On the Duties of Proconsul: Apparet autem expilatae hereditatis 
crimen eo casu intendi posse, quo casu furti agi non potest, scilicet ante aditam hereditatem, vel post aditam 
antequam res ab herede possessae sunt […]. “It is clear that this offense can be alleged in a case where no 
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 exile.117 As a result of introducing the crimen, the only possible application of usucapion 
in place of an heir was the case of the possessor of res hereditariae who was in good faith 
about the fact of being an heir.118 All the more signifi cant and spectacular consequences, 
so aggravating to the widespread moral opinion, had irrevocably ended.
Recapitulation
This concludes the history of usucapio pro herede before the close of the Classical Period: 
from a remedy to protect family and religious values to a severely punished crime. The 
oldest sources about usucapion come from the Law of the Twelve Tables,119 while a mil-
lennium later Justinian devoted almost the entire 41st book of his Digest to the subject. 
Over such a long period of time, the institution evolved, developing in response to social 
changes which brought with them new needs. Usucapio pro herede is a particular exam-
ple of usucapion. Initially, this kind of usucapio consisted in the possibility of taking the 
title of heir and the entire inheritance by possessing res hereditariae for a year. It was 
only later that the subject of usucapion became res hereditariae rather than the hereditas 
itself. Usucapion in place of an heir was created – as the fi rst separately named type of 
usucapion – already in the Archaic Period, when the requirements of good faith and a just 
basis for acquiring possession which led to usucapion, worked out much later, were not 
known yet. In this respect, usucapio pro herede did not change and even in The Institutes 
of Gaius it was an exception to the principle of the good faith of the usucaptor. With time, 
the Romans developed an increasingly bad opinion about the diff erent nature of this type 
of usucaption. The fact that during quite a short period of time any person could, in bad 
faith, take over the entire inheritance in the name of the law certainly raised objections. 
In his textbook, Gaius openly described usucapion in place of an heir as “dishonour-
able”. It is therefore unsurprising that a senatusconsultum enacted on the initiative of 
Emperor Hadrian enabled heirs, by means of a hereditatis petitio, to recover usucapted 
res hereditariae based on the fi ction of a lack of usucapion. In this way, the majority of 
cases of the actual application of usucapio pro herede was blocked. What contributed to 
the total marginalisation of the institution was the introduction of the crimen expilatae 
hereditatis, ascribed to Emperor Marcus Aurelius. The criminalisation included such 
deeds with regard to res hereditariae which would normally be subject to the actio furti. 
It was no longer possible to possess res hereditariae in bad faith, including vacant inher-
itances. The law prescribed severe punishment for the persons committing the crimen, 
including temporary exile and infamy. The only possible legal application of usucapio 
pro herede remained the case of a possessor of res hereditariae  who believed himself to 
action for theft can be brought, that is, before the inheritance has been accepted or, although it has been ac-
cepted, the heir has not taken possession of the assets…”
117  Cf. D. 47.18.1.1.
118  Cf. J. Krzynówek, Uwagi…, p. 161.
119  T. 7.4.
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be the heir. In this context it may be surprising that there was a place for a chapter about 
usucapio pro herede in Justinian’s compilation.
It is impossible to disregard the infl uence of non-legal factors on the development of 
usucapio pro herede. We should fi rstly mention the respect for the traditional domestic 
cult, which was the motive behind its creation. Some centuries later, the public opinion, 
outraged at the phenomenon of depriving rightful heirs of their inheritance, caused the 
marginalisation of this form of usucapion. The Justinian law preserved it, although only 
in a very limited scope, which was, however, morally acceptable, as it introduced the 
requirement of good faith. The experience of the application of usucapio pro herede 
clearly showed that fi nding the heir is always a value in itself, although not an absolute 
one. Usucapio was quite eff ective in fi nding any heir, but it also posed the threat of quick 
appropriation. Moreover, it still did not solve the problem of a hereditas damnosa. No 
one was interested in usucapting an inheritance which consisted mostly of debts. From 
the times of Augustus, the Roman practice turned to bodies governed by public law 
taking over vacant successions. Interestingly, the solutions adopted by the Polish legal 
system show that the contemporary legislator also accepts Augustus’ idea. At the same 
time, inheritance law does not allow the institution of usucapting an inheritance at all. As 
we can see, the experience of the Romans, who – realising that the price was too high – 
gave up usucapion in place of an heir, can be regarded as timely even in the present day.
Translated by Anna Sosenko
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